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INTRODUCTION 
In New York, an illogical and arbitrary common-law rule of evi-
dence, the corroboration rule, governs the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. On one hand, the 
New York Court of Appeals has correctly held that expert testimony re-
garding the factors that undermine an identification’s reliability (the iden-
tification’s cross-racial nature, for example) can provide “valuable” assis-
tance to a jury.1 But on the other hand, the Court has repeatedly held that 
a trial court can bar that expert testimony if it determines that the eyewit-
ness identification is corroborated by “accura[te]” evidence.2 This is so, 
the theory goes, because corroboration renders expert-identification testi-
mony less “importan[t]” and renders it “reasonable” for a judge to con-
clude that the identification was accurate.3 Even testimony offered by a 
witness with an obvious motive to lie (for example, a murder accom-
plice’s inculpatory testimony offered in exchange for a highly beneficial 
plea deal) suffices to bar an identification expert.4 
As shown below, the corroboration rule impairs the fact-finding pro-
cess, violating the fundamental rule that jurors, not courts, assess the re-
liability and weight of the evidence. Under the corroboration approach, 
courts usurp the jury’s power to resolve classic questions of fact: the iden-
tification’s reliability, the weight of the expert’s testimony, and the 
strength of the so-called corroboration. In every other area of our law, 
these classic factual questions are reserved for the jury. The corroboration 
rule is an anomaly. 
This Article proposes a change in the law. The Court of Appeals 
should abandon its corroboration approach and instead hold, as the Con-
necticut and District of Columbia high courts have held,5 that the apparent 
strength of the prosecution’s case is irrelevant to the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony challenging that case. 
At its most fundamental level, the corroboration bar improperly con-
flates the weight of the expert’s testimony with its relevancy.6 To be sure, 
evidence corroborating the identification—that is, evidence proving the 
 
 1 E.g., People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006). 
 2 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1161-62 (2016); see also People v. Santiago, 
17 N.Y.3d 661, 668-73 (2011); People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 266-69 (2009); People v. 
LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 456 (2007); Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 44-46; People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 
163 (2001). 
 3 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46. 
 4 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161-62 (majority opinion), 1169-70 (Rivera, J., dissent-
ing). 
 5 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297-99 (D.C. 2014); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 & 
n.44 (Conn. 2012). 
 6 See infra Section II(a). 
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defendant committed the offense—may increase the identification’s reli-
ability and, in turn, decrease the importance of an expert’s counter-testi-
mony. But the identification’s accuracy and the apparent importance of 
the defense expert’s testimony are quintessential jury questions that go to 
the weight, not admissibility, of expert-identification testimony.7 The cor-
roboration rule similarly ignores that it is the jury’s prerogative to deter-
mine whether the purported corroboration is accurate and thus reinforces 
the identification’s reliability.8 Judges cannot make that call. 
The anomalous corroboration rule creates serious doctrinal incon-
sistencies. No other class of experts—and certainly no prosecution ex-
perts—are barred because the adversary’s case seems strong.9 The corrob-
oration rule also leads to arbitrary and unpredictable results, requiring 
courts to determine whether the purported corroboration seems reliable 
enough to bar expert-identification testimony.10 As a result, appellate de-
cisions in this arena often look like summation battles, with judges debat-
ing, in fine detail, the corroboration’s reliability. That battle should be 
reserved for the jury. 
Common law aside, the corroboration rule violates the constitutional 
right to present a complete defense under Holmes v. South Carolina11 and 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to call witnesses in one’s 
“favor.”12 Like the common law, the Constitution prohibits courts from 
blocking material defense evidence because a judge finds the govern-
ment’s evidence reliable or strong. 
The Court of Appeals should abandon the corroboration rule and in-
stead hold that the testimony of a qualified expert on eyewitness identifi-
cations is admissible if it satisfies the traditional standards governing all 
other classes of expert testimony: (1) it is relevant; (2) its subject matter 
is beyond a jury’s common knowledge; and (3) it is generally accepted as 
reliable.13 The existence of corroborative evidence is irrelevant to the ad-
missibility analysis. 
 
 7 See infra Section II(a)-(c). 
 8 See infra Section II(b). 
 9 See infra Section II(f). 
 10 See infra Section II(g). 
 11 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (striking down a rule of evidence that barred the defense from 
presenting exculpatory evidence on the grounds that the prosecution’s case was strong). 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 13 See People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 422 (1994) (discussing the Frye standards for 
reliability as applied to DNA expert testimony); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288 (1990) 
(discussing standards for determining if an expert on rape trauma syndrome will be helpful to 
the jury); De Long v. Cty. of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307 (1983) (discussing when an expert is 
appropriate); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 50 (1979) (synthesizing a framework for de-
termining whether an expert may testify); MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, NEW 
YORK EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 7.2 (3d ed. 2017). 
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I. AN ERA OF HOSTILITY TO IDENTIFICATION EXPERTS GIVES WAY TO A 
MISGUIDED CORROBORATION STANDARD 
Eyewitness testimony is “overwhelmingly influential.”14 “[T]here is 
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the 
stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”15 The 
sheer number of convictions obtained in cases where a stranger’s identi-
fication was critical evidence confirms that jurors trust eyewitness identi-
fications.16 Polling data confirms the same point.17 
But because memory is unreliable and malleable, eyewitnesses often 
get it wrong.18 In the last few decades, state and federal prosecutors have 
convicted thousands of innocent people. In a significant number of those 
cases, eyewitness identifications—later discovered to be inaccurate—
played a major role at the trial.19 For instance, of the 300-plus individuals 
exonerated by DNA evidence since 1989, identifications played a role in 
at least 69% of those cases.20 
 
 14 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 n.4 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 15 Id. at 352. 
 16 See Alvin G. Goldstein et al., Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal 
Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71, 71 (1989) (“[A]ssuming 
approximately 2,570,000 arrests in the U.S. each year, about 77,000 individuals are suspects 
in cases in which the only critical evidence is eyewitness identification.”); see Bryan Scott 
Ryan, Alleviating Own-Race Bias in Cross-Racial Identifications, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 
115, 120-22, 122 n.30 (2015). 
 17 In one survey, 38% of participants responded that the phrase “I never forget a face” 
applied “very well” to them, while 44% believed the same regarding the phrase “I have an 
excellent memory.” Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ Under-
standing of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 207 tbl.3 (2006). Also, 
18% of that survey’s participants believed that eyewitness identifications were “very reliable,” 
while 15% believed they were “not very reliable” or “unreliable.” Id. at 207 tbl.4a. When told 
to assume that the “eyewitness has no motivation to lie” and “genuinely believes” in the ac-
curacy of their identification, 25% of participants said they considered eyewitness testimony 
to be “very reliable,” while only 11% said they were “not very reliable” or “unreliable.” Id. at 
207 tbl.4b. 
 18 E.g., Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395, 428 (Alaska 2016) (“[W]hile science has firmly 
established the ‘inherent unreliability of human perception and memory,’ this reality is outside 
‘the jury’s common knowledge,’ and often ‘contradicts jurors’ “commonsense” understand-
ings.’”) (quoting United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2006)); DNA Exoner-
ations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://perma.cc/UF55-GQCH (last visited 
January 15, 2021) (noting that 69% of DNA exonerations involve eyewitness misidentifica-
tion). 
 19 See People v. Boone, 30 N.Y.3d 521, 527-28 (2017) (citing INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra 
note 18). 
 20 INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 18. 
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Scientists have grappled with this problem, isolating numerous fac-
tors that bear on the reliability of an eyewitness identification.21 As the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, “The extensive and compre-
hensive scientific research, as reflected in hundreds of peer reviewed 
studies and meta-analyses, convincingly demonstrates the fallibility of 
eyewitness identification testimony and pinpoints an array of variables 
that are most likely to lead to a mistaken identification.”22 For example, 
studies confirm a weak correlation between an eyewitness’s confidence 
(such as a witness expressing absolute certainty about their identification) 
and accuracy.23 And as eyewitnesses who “exude supreme confidence” 
believe they are right, they “will not display the demeanor of the dishonest 
or biased witness,” thus making it difficult to expose the truth through 
cross-examination.24 
Scientists have also established, though simulation studies and sta-
tistical analysis, that the following factors diminish an identification’s re-
liability: 
● the presence of a weapon (due to the tendency to focus on the 
weapon instead of the suspect’s appearance); 
● high stress; 
● cross-racial bias (the suspect is a different race than the wit-
ness); 
● the passage of a brief period of time (as little as a few hours); 
● unconscious transference (a person seen in one context is con-
fused with a person seen in another); 
● the failure to ensure that the person administering a lineup (or 
other procedure) is unaware of the suspect’s identity (i.e., 
“double blind”); 
● the failure to inform the witness that the suspect may or may 
not be in the lineup and that the witness need not identify 
someone; and 
 
 21 Margaret A. Hagen & Sou Hee (Sophie) Yang, Criminal Defendants Have a Due Pro-
cess Right to an Expert on Eyewitness Reliability: Why the Court Was Wrong in Perry v. New 
Hampshire (2012), 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 47, 130 app. A (2016); see, e.g., People v. 
LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 453-55 (2007); State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 721 (Conn. 2012). 
 22 Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 721 (footnotes omitted). 
 23 Schmechel et al., supra note 17, at 198; People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 672 (2011). 
 24 Boone, 30 N.Y.3d at 531 (quoting State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 889 (N.J. 2011)). 
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● contamination through exposure to post-crime information 
(e.g., a witness reads that the suspect had black hair and in-
corporates that description into their memory, even if they did 
not actually observe black hair).25 
While this scientific research enjoys wide consensus, these findings 
are “largely unfamiliar to the average person” and actually “counterintu-
itive.”26 Polling studies have confirmed that people routinely believe, for 
instance, that an expression of confidence is strongly related to accuracy 
or that a weapon’s presence increases identification accuracy.27 Many ju-
rors similarly don’t know that stress or cross-racial distinctions under-
mine identification accuracy.28 
Jurors can thus benefit from expert testimony regarding the impact 
that certain factors have (or don’t have) on an identification’s accuracy. 
Since the verdict will have a monumental impact on the accused, simple 
fairness requires jurors to have access to relevant testimony that will help 
them assess damaging testimony.29 But in New York, jurors rarely hear 
such testimony because whenever the government has some evidence cor-
roborating the identification, the trial court can block an identification ex-
pert. 
* * * 
The Court of Appeals has long held that a qualified expert’s testi-
mony is admissible if it is: (1) relevant (as with all evidence); (2) helpful 
 
 25 E.g., id. at 528-29 (cross-racial bias); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 721-23 (stress, weapon fo-
cus, cross-racial identification, diminished memory, absence of double-blind procedure, ac-
cess to post-event or post-identification information about the event or identification, uncon-
scious transference); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 904-10 (stress, weapon focus, duration, distance 
and lighting, cross-racial bias, influence of private actors, speed of identification); John C. 
Brigham et al., The Influence of Race on Eyewitness Memory, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS 
PSYCHOLOGY 257 (R. C. L. Lindsay et al. eds., 2014) (cross-racial bias); Jonathan M. Fawcett 
et al., Looking Down the Barrel of a Gun: What Do We Know About the Weapon Focus Ef-
fect?, 5 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 257, 258 (2016) (weapon focus); Saul M. 
Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A New Survey 
of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405 (2001) (surveying psychologists about 30 different 
eyewitness phenomena). 
 26 Guilbert, 49 A.3d at 723; id. at 720 (“[There is] widespread judicial recognition that 
eyewitness identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the aver-
age juror.”); see Third Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications, 2019 Report of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications, 
92 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 23 (2019). 
 27 Schmechel et al., supra note 17, at 184, 196-97. 
 28 Id. at 197, 200. 
 29 Benn v. United States, 978 A.2d 1257, 1274 (D.C. 2009) (“Expert testimony can there-
fore be critical in helping to confirm—or undermine—a juror’s ‘near certitude’ of . . . guilt 
when the prosecution’s case is grounded on the identification of eyewitnesses, and in further-
ing the truth-seeking purpose of a trial.”). 
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to the jury—that is, it would inform the jury of something they “would 
not ordinarily be expected to know already” (i.e., the helpfulness stand-
ard);30 and (3) generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific 
community (i.e., the Frye standard).31 
Applying these standards, New York courts have, for decades now, 
ratified expert testimony in hundreds of contexts, finding that such testi-
mony would help clarify a material factual question.32 Nevertheless, 
throughout the 1990s, New York appellate courts routinely rejected ex-
pert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications, concluding that the 
subject matter was within a jury’s common knowledge.33 A “position of 
skepticism and hostility” dominated; “one opinion after another displayed 
a distinct distaste for such testimony.”34 
But in 2001, the Court of Appeals formally ended the categorical bar 
to expert-identification testimony in People v. Lee.35 Unfortunately, Lee 
effectively paved the way for New York courts to continue the trend of 
precluding such testimony under an illogical corroboration rule.36 
Lee considered whether the trial court had erred in blocking a con-
cededly relevant expert on numerous identification factors, including 
cross-racial identification, stress, and confidence.37 Applying the helpful-
ness standard, the Court held that expert-identification testimony would 
aid the jury because the subject is beyond the jurors’ common 
knowledge.38 As the Court explained, jurors are unaware of the “psycho-
logical studies regarding the accuracy of an identification.”39 And as the 
Court confirmed a few years later, factors such as the cross-racial effect, 
stress, and the relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy 
are “counter-intuitive,” or “at least not so obvious or well known that or-
dinary jurors would not benefit from hearing them.”40 
 
 30 People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 288 (1990). 
 31 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also People v. Wesley, 83 
N.Y.2d 417, 422-23 (1994), De Long v. Cty. of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 307 (1983); People v. 
Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 50 (1979). 
 32 MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 13, at § 7.2.2. 
 33 E.g., People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 832 (1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting); People v. 
Gibbs, 550 N.Y.S.2d 400, 400 (App. Div. 1990); People v. Knighton, 560 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516 
(App. Div. 1990). 
 34 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206.5 (8th ed. 2020). 
 35 96 N.Y.2d 157, 160 (2001). 
 36 Id. at 163. 
 37 Id. at 161. 
 38 Id. at 162. 
 39 Id.; see also People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 455 (2007). 
 40 People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006). 
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As for the Frye-general-acceptance standard, Lee held that expert-
identification testimony is not, as a categorical matter, barred by Frye.41 
Instead, when novel testimony is at issue, courts must conduct a hearing 
to determine whether the testimony is generally accepted as reliable (the 
Lee trial court had not done so because it rejected the expert on other 
grounds).42 
Having held that the helpfulness and Frye standards did not bar the 
relevant expert testimony, Lee should have found the testimony admissi-
ble under longstanding common-law rules.43 Instead, apparently forging 
a compromise between a categorical bar and the traditional relevancy 
standard, the Court injected an artificial limitation on identification ex-
perts.44 Under Lee and its progeny, a trial court can—unlike with every 
other class of expert testimony—reject an otherwise admissible and rele-
vant identification expert if the judge believes the identification is corrob-
orated by evidence bearing “strong indicia of accuracy.”45 Under this 
standard, so long as a judge finds that some accurate evidence, beyond 
the identification, proves the identity element of the offense, the accused 
cannot challenge the identification with expert testimony. 
In applying this corroboration rule, the Court of Appeals has set a 
low bar, finding that even readily assailable evidence justifies expert pre-
clusion: 
● an accomplice-cooperator’s testimony against a defendant ac-
cused of shooting a man in a barbershop (offered in exchange 
for a favorable plea deal);46 
● a robbery defendant’s possession of a stolen vehicle months 
after a gunpoint theft of that vehicle;47 and 
 
 41 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 162-63. 
 42 Id. 
 43 E.g., People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 287-88 (1990); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 
40, 50 (1979). 
 44 Unfortunately, a few other state supreme courts have similarly chosen a middle ground 
between a relevancy standard and a categorical bar, i.e., a corroboration rule. See People v. 
McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d 549, 552-
53 (Ga. 2000); State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003). These decisions adopt a cor-
roboration rule without explaining why the law of evidence permits it. 
 45 People v. Santiago, 17 N.Y.3d 661, 671 (2011); see also People v. McCullough, 27 
N.Y.3d 1158, 1168 (2016); People v. Abney, 13 N.Y.3d 251, 266-68 (2009); People v. 
LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 456 (2007) (“The trial court should weigh defendant’s request to 
admit expert testimony against factors ‘such as the centrality of the identification issue and 
the existence of corroborating evidence.’”) (quoting Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 163); Young, 7 N.Y.3d 
at 45-46. 
 46 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1163 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 47 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 160-61. 
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● testimony that a robbery defendant gave the stolen property 
to two acquaintances days after the robbery.48 
These cases are just a sample of the dozens of appellate decisions affirm-
ing the denial of an expert on corroboration grounds.49 
The Court of Appeals has attempted to justify its corroboration rule 
with a few sentences of conclusory analysis.50 Lee, which introduced the 
rule, stated that corroboration is a “relevant factor” without explaining 
why.51 The Court later reinforced the corroboration rule in Young, where 
the complainant identified the defendant even though the suspect had ob-
scured his face with a scarf (revealing only his eyes, forehead, and part of 
his nose).52 Young recognized that the proffered expert testimony regard-
ing eyewitness confidence and cross-racial identification “[c]ertainly . . . 
could have been valuable to a juror.”53 The Court even held that the prof-
fered testimony was “counter-intuitive,” so the jury would benefit from 
hearing it.54 Nevertheless, the trial court had the discretion to bar this help-
ful testimony because the identification was corroborated: the defendant’s 
acquaintances testified that a month after the robbery, he gave them bin-
oculars and gloves, the same property taken from a car parked outside the 
robbery location.55 This corroborative evidence, the Court held, justified 
expert preclusion for three related reasons: (1) it rendered it “reasonable” 
for the “trial court to conclude” that the “identification was quite unlikely 
to be mistaken”; (2) it “significantly diminishe[d]” the expert testimony’s 
“importance”; and (3) it rendered the expert testimony an “unnecessary 
distraction.”56 The Court did not attempt to explain why a court can usurp 
the jury’s fact-finding role by (1) crediting the corroboration (before the 
 
 48 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46. 
 49 E.g., People v. Saunders, 111 N.Y.S.3d 445, 452 (App. Div. 2019) (holding that the 
voice identification of a masked perpetrator was corroborated by the perpetrator’s “threatening 
Facebook message” to the victim’s sister and blood-stained money in his possession); People 
v. Smith, 869 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (App. Div. 2008) (finding “consciousness-of-guilt evidence 
and partially incriminating statements to the police” were sufficient to corroborate defendant’s 
guilt); see also People v. Granger, 997 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 2014); People v. Page, 964 
N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Div. 2013); People v. Rodriguez, 949 N.Y.S.2d 441 (App. Div. 2012); 
People v. Munnerlyn, 937 N.Y.S.2d 858 (App. Div. 2012); People v. Perez, 925 N.Y.S.2d 501 
(App. Div. 2011); People v. Fernandez, 910 N.Y.S.2d 140 (App. Div. 2010). 
 50 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161-62; People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379-80 (2013); 
Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46; Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 163. 
 51 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 163. 
 52 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 45 (majority opinion). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 43, 45. 
 56 Id. at 46. 
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jury does so) and then (2) assessing whether this credited evidence ren-
ders the identification accurate and expert testimony “[un]importan[t].”57 
Nor did the Court explain why a testimony’s apparent “importance”—not 
its relevancy—controls. 
In People v. Oddone, the Court of Appeals offered new and internally 
inconsistent justifications for its corroboration rule.58 In dicta, the Court 
stated that expert-identification testimony is “collateral” because it “ad-
vis[es] the jury on how to evaluate the testimony of fact witnesses.”59 Two 
sentences later, the Court explicitly recognized that judges do not “nor-
mally exclude relevant evidence merely because the case against the de-
fendant is strong.”60 Nevertheless, the Court explained that New York 
trial courts can do just that: “[T]he overall strength of the [government’s] 
case is important [to the analysis] because where the eyewitness testi-
mony is not crucial, expert testimony about the collateral issue of eyewit-
ness reliability can be a harmful distraction.”61 
Three years later in People v. McCullough,62 the Court again tinkered 
with the corroboration rule’s underlying doctrinal justification. 
McCullough involved a robbery and murder in a barbershop. The govern-
ment alleged that after McCullough and two co-defendants entered the 
barbershop, McCullough tried to lock the door.63 The group then ordered 
the eyewitness and the murder victim to drop to the ground, demanded 
money and drugs, and struck them with pistols.64 After they took $200 
from the murder victim, one man (not McCullough) purportedly shot the 
victim, killing him.65 The co-defendants and the shooter fled, but the 
shooter returned and placed a gun over the eyewitness’s head, producing 
a clicking sound (no shots were fired).66 After that, the group purportedly 
entered a car and drove off.67 
The accomplice getaway driver testified against McCullough at trial. 
He claimed that he dropped McCullough and the co-defendants off by the 
barbershop before the shooting, drove off with them moments later, and 
later saw the group with guns and money.68 The accomplice initially 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 22 N.Y.3d 369 (2013). 
 59 Id. at 379. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 27 N.Y.3d 1158 (2016). 
 63 Id. at 1159-60. 
 64 Id. at 1164 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 1160 (majority opinion). 
 68 Id. at 1163 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
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failed to select McCullough from a photo array a month after the crimes.69 
But, indicted for murder and facing a sentence of at least 25 years to life, 
the accomplice later changed his tune, testifying against McCullough in 
exchange for a robbery plea and a 10-year-flat sentence.70 Also at trial, 
the eyewitness, a stranger to McCullough, identified McCullough as “the 
last man to enter the barbershop.”71 
The trial court blocked an identification expert because it found that 
the eyewitness’s identification was corroborated by the accomplice’s tes-
timony.72 McCullough was convicted of murder and sentenced to 25 years 
to life in prison. 
In a 4-3 decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s de-
cision.73 The Court held that corroboration is one of the “factors for trial 
courts to consider in determining whether expert testimony on eye-wit-
ness identification ‘would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict.’”74 In doing 
so, the Court introduced a new theory: The helpfulness analysis, which 
governs all expert testimony, does not merely consider whether the expert 
will assist the jury by teaching it something it may not already know.75 
Instead, it also considers the strength of the adversary’s evidence. 
McCullough did not cite a single case adopting that theory. 
McCullough then held, in conclusory fashion, that given the accom-
plice’s testimony, the “trial court was entitled to reject the expert testi-
mony after balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prej-
udicial or otherwise harmful effects.”76 Again, the Court did not explain 
how the trial court had “balanced” anything; indeed, the trial court had 
barred the expert solely on corroboration grounds and did no balancing at 
all.77 
* * * 
Ultimately, Lee and its progeny hold that a court can bar expert-iden-
tification testimony if the identification is not the only evidence against 
the accused. The theory is that corroboration enhances the eyewitness 
 
 69 Id. at 1169. 
 70 Id. at 1165. 
 71 Id. at 1164. 
 72 Id. at 1160 n.* (majority opinion) (“The expert was expected to testify as to how the 
level of violence, the length of the incident and the presence of a weapon could influence an 
eyewitness’s ability to make an identification.”). 
 73 Id. at 1161-62. 
 74 Id. at 1161 (quoting People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (2001)). 
 75 See, e.g., People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006). 
 76 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161. 
 77 Id. 
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identification’s reliability and diminishes the importance of any expert 
testimony challenging that identification.78 
As established below, this line of cases asks the wrong questions, 
ignores settled common-law doctrine, usurps the jury’s fact-finding func-
tion, and violates the Constitution. The Court of Appeals should abandon 
its judge-made corroboration approach. 
II. THE COMMON-LAW CORROBORATION RULE SHOULD BE DISCARDED 
A. The corroboration rule ignores the relevancy standard. 
It is longstanding public policy that jurors should have access to all 
the relevant evidence so they can best determine the truth.79 The Court of 
Appeals has thus repeatedly “reaffirmed the well-established rules that 
evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove any material 
fact and that all relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless admission 
violates some exclusionary rule.”80 Questions regarding the weight, im-
portance, and reliability of the evidence are reserved for the jury.81 
The corroboration rule ignores the relevancy standard. Instead of 
simply assessing whether expert testimony is relevant to the identifica-
tion’s reliability, the corroboration rule additionally requires a court to 
consider whether, given the purported corroboration, the identification is 
“unlikely to be mistaken,” thus diminishing the importance of responsive 
expert testimony.82 But no common-law doctrine authorizes a trial court 
to preclude relevant defense testimony on corroboration grounds.83 The 
governing inquiry is relevancy, not “importance,” and certainly not im-
portance given the adversary’s evidence. As the Connecticut Supreme 
Court held in rejecting a corroboration rule, “the law of evidence does not 
 
 78 People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013); Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46; Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 
at 163. 
 79 People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 509 (1995); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 44 
(1964). 
 80 People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 241 (1987); see also People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 
769, 777 (1988). 
 81 E.g., Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012) (“[T]he jury, not the judge, 
traditionally determines the reliability of evidence.”); People v. Marte, 12 N.Y.3d 583, 589 
(2009) (“[O]ur system relies on juries to assess the reliability of eyewitnesses, aided by cross-
examination, by the arguments of counsel, and by whatever other evidence supports or con-
tradicts the witnesses’ testimony.”); People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28, 34 (2006); People v. Ba-
tashure, 75 N.Y.2d 306, 309 (1990) (“[T]he quality and weight of the proof [are] reserved for 
the trier of fact.”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility 
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from 
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”). 
 82 Young, 7 N.Y.3d at 46. 
 83 In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 297-99 (D.C. 2014). 
74 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:62 
grant trial courts the liberty to decide what evidence is admissible based, 
either in whole or in part, on the strength of the [adversary’s] case.”84 
Evidence corroborating the identification undermines the weight, not ad-
missibility, of expert-identification testimony.85 
Even worse, the corroboration rule is grounded in the theory that a 
judge can block the defense from challenging a government eyewitness 
because corroboration renders that eyewitness reliable. The corroboration 
rule thus usurps the jury’s power to determine the identification’s accu-
racy—a quintessential jury question.86 
If taken seriously, the corroboration approach would fundamentally 
change New York evidence law. After all, barring a relevant identification 
expert because the eyewitness seems reliable given corroboration is no 
different than barring cross-examination of the eyewitness on the same 
grounds (for example, cross-examination regarding eyesight or a prior 
perjury conviction). In the cross-examination context, the theory would 
be the same: The government’s evidence proves the eyewitness is relia-
ble, so the cross-examination is a “harmful distraction.”87 But that is not 
how a criminal trial works. No court has ever suggested (outside the iden-
tification-expert context) that a judge can canvass the evidence, deem the 
government’s evidence reliable, and then bootstrap that reliability deter-
mination into a defense-witness-preclusion order. The Court of Appeals 
even recognized that point in Oddone, stating that judges “do not nor-
mally exclude relevant evidence merely because the case against the de-
fendant is strong.”88 But Oddone ignored that basic rule when it con-
firmed that courts can block expert testimony for that exact reason.89 
Of course, a jury might ultimately find the eyewitness reliable or the 
identification-expert testimony insignificant because the identification is 
corroborated. But a judge lacks the authority to usurp the jury’s preroga-
tive to make those calls. 
In pinning admissibility to the apparent strength of the government’s 
case, the corroboration rule confuses harmless error, a standard that only 
 
 84 State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 n.44 (Conn. 2012); accord In re L.C., 92 A.3d at 
297 (“[C]orroborative evidence [is] irrelevant to the question of the admissibility of appel-
lant’s proffered expert testimony . . . .”). 
 85 See e.g., In re L.C., 92 A.3d at 298-99; see generally Batashure, 75 N.Y.2d at 309 
(finding that questions regarding the weight of evidence are reserved for the jury). 
 86 See e.g., Marte, 12 N.Y.3d at 589; Drake, 7 N.Y.3d at 34. 
 87 People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 379-80. 
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governs appeals, with trial-level admissibility.90 If the trial court errone-
ously precludes an identification expert, the government can defend the 
conviction by showing harmless error, that is, its non-identification evi-
dence was “overwhelming” and there was no reasonable possibility that 
the expert preclusion impacted the verdict.91 The corroboration standard 
poses an identical question: Given the non-identification evidence in the 
case, would the identification expert likely be important to the jury?92 But 
appellate courts apply harmless error after the jury has convicted the de-
fendant. No one has ever argued that harmless-error analysis governs the 
admissibility of evidence at the trial level. 
B. The corroboration rule usurps the jury’s prerogative to determine 
whether the purported corroboration should be credited in the first 
place. 
Beyond ignoring that the weight of both the expert testimony and the 
identification are classic jury questions, the corroboration rule ignores 
that the reliability of the purported corroboration itself is a quintessential 
jury question. To block defense evidence on corroboration grounds, a 
judge must necessarily credit the purported corroboration. But in our sys-
tem, a jury, not a judge, decides whether the government’s proof should 
be credited.93 And the jury makes that call after hearing all the evidence. 
The corroboration rule thus distorts the fact-finding process. After 
all, a jury may reject the purported corroborative evidence or testimony, 
thus rendering the eyewitness identification dispositive of the defendant’s 
fate. For instance, the McCullough jury may have easily found the accom-
plice’s testimony placing the defendant at the homicide scene—offered in 
exchange for a beneficial plea bargain94—incredible. And if the jury had 
done that, the only remaining evidence was a stranger’s identification. If 
the deliberations proceeded in that plausible manner, the defendant would 
have had a compelling need for expert-identification testimony. But under 
 
 90 See, e.g., In re L.C., 92 A.3d at 299 (discussing how a corroboration rule conflates 
harmless error analysis with admissibility analysis); Schmechel et al., supra note 17, at 190 
(“Harmless error review by appellate courts can effectively ensure that convictions will sur-
vive in those rare cases where any expert testimony would truly have been unimportant to the 
jury’s verdict. This appears to be the intent of some trial and appellate courts when applying 
a corroboration rationale to exclude experts in cases where the evidence is in fact overwhelm-
ing; the courts are effectively saying that any exclusion of the expert testimony is harmless 
because there was so much independent evidence supporting the guilt of the defendant.”). 
 91 E.g., People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240-41 (1975). 
 92 See People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 46 (2006). 
 93 E.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 330 (2006). 
 94 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1165 (2016) (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
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the corroboration rule, Mr. McCullough was out of luck because a judge 
decided that the accomplice’s testimony seemed accurate. 
The corroboration rule also ignores that evidence can reinforce other 
evidence—that is, a jury could find the purported corroboration (e.g., an 
accomplice-cooperator’s testimony) more reliable because of the identi-
fication. In McCullough, for instance, the jury could have placed more 
weight on the accomplice’s corroborative testimony because an eyewit-
ness identified McCullough. But expert-identification testimony may 
have caused the jury to doubt the identification and, in turn, the accom-
plice’s testimony too. Thus, by blocking an identification expert, a court 
artificially enhances the corroboration’s probative value, increasing the 
likelihood that the jury will credit it and convict. 
The better approach is to stop tinkering with the jury’s deliberations 
and allow it to hear relevant expert testimony, as the Appellate Division 
did in People v. Evans, a false-confession expert case. Evans rejected the 
government’s claim that the trial court’s preclusion of a false-confession 
expert was permissible “in light of the overwhelming evidence corrobo-
rating the confession.”95 Evans held that courts cannot “ponder” a confes-
sion’s veracity by “comparing the details given in the confession with the 
details contained in the witnesses’ testimony.”96 Instead, that issue is for 
the jury, which can “consider the details of [a] confession, along with the 
details described by the witnesses and decide whether the People met their 
burden.”97 Evans is right. Because jurors—not judges—determine the 
strength of the government’s evidence, judges cannot pin the admissibil-
ity of defense evidence to their assessment of the government’s case. 
The Evans dissent claimed that a corroboration rule was necessary to 
prevent the “floodgates” from opening up.98 This may very well be the 
central argument of those who support the corroboration rule: without it, 
the accused can introduce expert testimony whenever the government in-
troduces a stranger’s identification into evidence. This argument reflects 
a pernicious trend in our law: The government routinely seeks to nullify 
an individual right with the “audacious” counter that—even if a “substan-
tive analysis of law” mandates that right—courts should reject it because 
individuals will assert the right too often.99 Although rarely openly de-
scribed as such, this floodgates argument is (at least at face value) a cash 
 
 95 People v. Evans, 32 N.Y.S.3d 119, 121-124 (App. Div. 2016). 
 96 Id. at 123. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 133 (Tom, J.P., dissenting) (arguing that if a corroboration rule does not govern 
the admissibility of false-confession-expert testimony, the “floodgates” “would open up”). 
 99 See Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1052-53, 
1077 (2013) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 
15 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); accord Crooker v. TSA, 323 F. Supp. 3d 148, 157 (D. 
2021] ABANDON THE CORROBORATION RULE 77 
argument, rooted in the belief that we should limit rights because they 
cost too much. Our courts are flooded with these floodgates arguments.100 
Besides being a convenient cover for limiting individual liberty,101 
this floodgates argument has no principled foundation, especially here.102 
No legal principle allows a court to block the defense from challenging a 
government witness because the government has opted to use that class 
of witnesses (here, eyewitnesses) in many cases. Individual rights trump 
whatever money or time we gain by blocking expert testimony in the few 
cases where defendants bypass a coercive plea regime and demand a trial. 
A too-many-defense-witnesses problem pales in comparison to the more 
 
Mass. 2018) (“The floodgates argument is frequently raised with but vague meaning and few 
facts to support its sometimes-shaky foundations.”). 
 100 E.g., Levy, supra note 99, at 1022 (explaining that floodgates arguments are frequently 
advanced in our courts). 
 101 Blackstone recognized the obvious point that it is easier to limit rights by relying on 
pretexts, such as floodgates concerns, instead of openly challenging rights themselves. United 
States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2384 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“In what now seems a 
prescient passage, Blackstone warned that the true threat to trial by jury would come less from 
‘open attacks,’ which ‘none will be so hardy as to make,’ as from subtle ‘machinations, which 
may sap and undermine i[t] by introducing new and arbitrary methods.’”) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 298, 343 
(1769)). Judges and scholars have recognized that point in the “floodgates” context, observing 
that the floodgates argument can serve as a pretext to limit rights. E.g., Levy, supra note 99, 
at 1074 (“[Supreme Court] justices often invoke floodgates arguments without much support 
for why they believe a large number of cases will come . . . . Of course, it can be easy to hide 
one’s claims behind this kind of hyperbole—and there is reason to suspect that parties and 
justices have invoked this language at times precisely because, in the words of Justice Powell, 
a ‘floodgates’ argument can be easy to make and difficult to rebut.’”) (quoting Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 304 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)); Tim Bain, The Wrong Tort in the 
Right Place: Avenues for the Development of Civil Privacy Protections in New Zealand, 22 
CANTERBURY L. REV. 297, 304 (2016) (referring to the floodgates argument as “that ubiqui-
tous excuse for judicial conservativism”); Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the 
“Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 412 (2003). 
 102 See Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2384; see also People v. Tiger, 32 N.Y.3d 91, 118 (2018) 
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (“‘[C]onservation of judicial resources’ does not appear alongside 
‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) 
(“Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when 
we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value 
judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. And current 
limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies 
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional 
principles.”) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-
16 (1969) (“[P]roliferation of claims” does not justify a refusal to change the law; although 
“extra litigation” may result from the change, that is “no reason for a court to eschew a meas-
ure of its jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 56 (5th ed. 1984) (“It is the business of the law to remedy 
wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation.’”). 
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fundamental problem of too many innocent defendants sitting in prison 
due to mistaken identifications. 
Ultimately, the fact that courts are currently precluding many de-
fendants from introducing valuable and material evidence in many cases 
is a reason to change the law, not to maintain the status quo.103 Any fear 
of too many defense witnesses seems to be grounded in a fear of “too 
much justice.”104 
C. The Court of Appeals’s vague theory that an identification expert is 
“collateral” also fails to justify the corroboration rule. 
In Oddone, the Court suggested, for the first time, that expert testi-
mony is “collateral” because it “advis[es] the jury on how to evaluate the 
testimony of fact witnesses.”105 This argument fails for a few reasons. 
By claiming that this class of expert testimony is collateral, Oddone 
was ultimately suggesting that, although relevant, expert-identification 
testimony generally has remote relevance.106 But this vague, “collateral” 
point has nothing to do with corroborative evidence. Even if the govern-
ment’s case rests entirely on identification testimony, expert testimony is 
still, under Oddone’s theory, collateral because it helps the jury evaluate 
other testimony. 
More importantly, expert-identification testimony cannot be styled 
“collateral” under the theory that it has some remote connection to the 
 
 103 See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n.3 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (“To the extent that 
this argument shades into the contention that such claims should be denied because otherwise 
courts would experience a ‘flood of litigation,’ we point out that courts are responsible for 
dealing with cases on their merits, whether there be few suits or many; the existence of a 
multitude of claims merely shows society’s pressing need for legal redress.”); Tobin, 24 
N.Y.2d at 615-16; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 102. 
 104 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also 
Schmechel, et al., supra note 17, at 190 (“Ending reliance on corroborating evidence will ad-
mittedly lead to the admission of expert testimony in many more cases. But this is a natural 
product of the adversarial system in which juries and not judges should resolve disputed ques-
tions about the reliability of a piece of government proof. Courts need not fear that such a 
regime would necessarily invalidate convictions in cases where judges erroneously exclude 
expert testimony. Harmless error review by appellate courts can effectively ensure that con-
victions will survive in those rare cases where any expert testimony would truly have been 
unimportant to the jury’s verdict.”). 
 105 People v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013). 
 106 Id. (“On the other hand, applications to admit evidence of this kind—in essence, testi-
mony by an expert witness advising the jury on how to evaluate the testimony of fact wit-
nesses—must be approached with caution. Such testimony is collateral to the main issues in 
the case, and we have warned that the exploration of collateral issues tends ‘to obscure the 
main issue in the minds of the jury, to lead them away from the principal matters which require 
their attention and to protract trials to an unreasonable extent without any corresponding ad-
vantage to any one concerned.’”) (quoting People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 82 (1913)). 
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case. An identification expert squarely undermines testimony (an eyewit-
ness identification) that is often essential to the government’s case, as it 
was in every case discussed above where the Court of Appeals applied 
the bar. It is hard to see how informative testimony that undermines dis-
positive prosecution testimony can somehow be labelled “collateral.” 
And of course, if expert testimony were collateral because it helps 
the jury “evaluate the testimony of fact witnesses,”107 large swaths of ex-
pert testimony could be precluded on that tenuous ground. For instance, 
expert testimony that the complainant’s behavior is consistent with rape 
trauma or child abuse—commonly introduced by the government—
would be collateral and thus subject to a corroboration rule.108 But none 
of this testimony is subject to a corroboration rule. Oddone’s analysis ig-
nores that helping the jury evaluate the facts is not some kind of inferior 
expert role. Instead, it is an expert’s core function. 
D. Corroboration is irrelevant to the helpfulness standard governing 
all experts. 
Still searching for a doctrinal justification for the corroboration ap-
proach the Court of Appeals created 15 years earlier, the McCullough 
Court (in 2016) tried to shoehorn the corroboration factor into the broader 
question of “whether expert testimony on eye-witness identification 
‘would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict.’”109 This effort fails too. 
Although McCullough cited Lee for this new justification, Lee held 
no such thing. Lee correctly held that the expert testimony’s subject mat-
ter must “aid the jury”—that is, it must convey information beyond a lay 
person’s common knowledge.110 That holding is consistent with 
longstanding case law, which in assessing the helpfulness standard, has 
considered whether the testimony was beyond the “ken of the typical ju-
ror,”111 not whether it would assist the jury in light of the strength of the 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387 (2000) (“We have long held that expert testi-
mony regarding rape trauma syndrome, abused child syndrome or similar conditions may be 
admitted to explain behavior of a victim that might appear unusual or that jurors may not be 
expected to understand.”). 
 109 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1161 (quoting People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 
162 (2001)). 
 110 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 162 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own 
experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, 
it cannot be said that psychological studies regarding the accuracy of an identification are 
within the ken of the typical juror.”). 
 111 E.g., People v. Rivers, 18 N.Y.3d 222, 228 (2011) (quoting De Long v. Cty of Erie, 60 
N.Y.2d 296, 307 (1983)); People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 45 (2006) (“As we made clear in 
Lee, a court’s exercise of discretion in a case like this depends in large part on whether the 
‘specialized knowledge’ of the expert can give jurors more perspective than they get from 
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adversary’s case. “The fact that the identification was corroborated is ir-
relevant to the pertinent [helpfulness] question, which is whether the sci-
entific subject matter of [the expert’s] testimony was beyond the ken of 
the average layperson.”112 
E. The corroboration rule is onerous. 
The corroboration rule is a harsh bludgeon that “unfairly restrict[s] 
the defendant’s opportunity to mount a defense.”113 Under the rule, a de-
fendant cannot present expert-identification testimony unless the govern-
ment’s case consists of nothing but an identification. Even a witness with 
an obvious motive to lie, like the cooperator in McCullough (who re-
ceived a significant sentence reduction in exchange for his testimony), 
satisfies the corroboration rule.114 “If expert testimony was not allowed in 
[McCullough], one can hardly imagine an occasion where corroborating 
evidence is more unreliable such that the expert testimony would be held 
admissible.”115 Ultimately, because the government will rarely rely exclu-
sively on an identification, defendants will rarely overcome this harsh 
barrier. 
Even the appellate harmless error standard—mistakenly converted 
by the Court of Appeals into a free-standing rule of admissibility in this 
context—is not so harsh. To show harmless error, the government must 
prove overwhelming evidence.116 But the corroboration standard merely 
requires any evidence which, if credited, corroborates guilt.117 For in-
stance, a robbery defendant’s possession of the stolen property months 
 
‘their day-to-day experience, their common observation and their knowledge.’ In other words, 
could the expert tell the jury something significant that jurors would not ordinarily be expected 
to know already?”) (citations omitted); People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 433 (1983) (“It is 
for the trial court in the first instance to determine when jurors are able to draw conclusions 
from the evidence based on their day-to-day experience, their common observation and their 
knowledge, and when they would be benefited by the specialized knowledge of an expert 
witness.”). 
 112 Patterson v. United States, 37 A.3d 230, 250 n.30 (D.C. 2012) (Glickman, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added), concurring opinion subsequently withdrawn, 56 A.3d 1152 (D.C. 
2012); see also In re L.C., 92 A.3d 290, 298-99 (D.C. 2014) (“[T]he criterion of helpfulness 
is not a grant of authority to the trial judge to exclude relevant and otherwise admissible expert 
testimony merely because it is against the expected weight of the evidence.”). 
 113 State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 738 (Conn. 2012). 
 114 McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161, 1165-66 (2016) (holding that an accomplice cooper-
ator’s testimony was sufficient corroboration where accomplice was facing 25 years to life on 
a murder charge and testified against the defendant in exchange for a 10-year sentence on a 
robbery conviction); Karianne M. Polimeni, New York on Eyewitness Identifications: Pro-
gressive or Regressive?, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 660 (2018).  
 115 Polimeni, supra note 114, at 660. 
 116 People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241 (1975). 
 117 People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 162-63 (2001). 
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after the robbery satisfies the corroboration standard.118 While that incon-
clusive evidence would not justify affirmance on harmless error 
grounds,119 it nevertheless justifies blocking the expert from testifying at 
the trial level. 
The Court’s approach to balancing prejudice and probative value in 
this area also unfairly stacks the deck against defendants. McCullough 
held that a court must determine whether the expert testimony’s potential 
for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.120 But the Court 
has taken one single factor (corroboration) and placed it on both sides of 
the scales. Under Lee and its progeny, expert testimony (1) has minimal 
probative value because the identification is corroborated and (2) is pur-
portedly prejudicial (i.e., a “distraction”) for exactly the same reason.121 
This double dipping ensures that any judge interested in blocking this tes-
timony can do so with ease and then immunize the decision from appellate 
review under an abuse-of-discretion standard. As a result, the longstand-
ing categorical bar of expert-identification testimony (formally rejected 
by Lee),122 can live on under the guise of discretionary balancing. 
F. The corroboration rule is an anomaly. 
In no other area of New York law does a court assess the admissibil-
ity of evidence by analyzing the strength of the adversary’s case. The rule 
is an anomaly. 
Even worse, this anomalous rule only targets defense experts. No 
court has ever suggested, let alone held, that a court can block a govern-
ment expert because the defense theory is corroborated. For example, 
courts have not barred the government from presenting expert testimony 
on child abuse accommodation syndrome,123 rape trauma syndrome,124 or 
drug-dealing practices125 because the defense’s counter-theory is corrob-
orated by significant evidence. The arbitrary corroboration jurisprudence 
is thus a one-way ratchet that favors only the government. As Professor 
 
 118 Id. at 161-63. 
 119 Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 240-41. 
 120 People v. McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d 1158, 1161 (2016). 
 121 People v. Young, 7 N.Y.3d 40, 46 (2006); see McCullough, 27 N.Y.3d at 1161; People 
v. Oddone, 22 N.Y.3d 369, 379 (2013). 
 122 Lee, 96 N.Y.2d at 162-63. 
 123 See People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 465 (2011) (permitting expert testimony that 
certain behaviors by a child are consistent with sexual abuse). 
 124 See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 292 (1990) (admitting expert testimony regarding 
rape trauma syndrome because it can “assist jurors in reaching a verdict by dispelling common 
misperceptions about rape.”). 
 125 See People v. Hicks, 2 N.Y.3d 750, 751 (2004) (citing People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 
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Risinger has explained, the judiciary’s willingness to permit the govern-
ment to educate the jury regarding certain behaviors (e.g., rape trauma 
syndrome and drug-dealing practices) while barring similar defense ef-
forts reflects an anti-defense bias.126 “Something is wrong with this pic-
ture.”127 
As the Court of Appeals has confirmed, “one of the essential ingre-
dients of due process of law is reciprocity.”128 Thus, the government can-
not adopt rules that benefit the government while depriving the accused 
of those same benefits.129 Lee and its progeny ignore that core principle. 
G. The corroboration rule produces arbitrary results. 
The corroboration rule is inherently subjective, requiring judges, like 
jurors, to assess the totality of the government’s case. Predictably, this 
subjective standard produces arbitrary results as judges cannot employ it 
consistently. As one article aptly put it, the corroboration approach 
“clearly places too much discretion in the hands of the judge, so much so 
that [it] is not a protection at all, but rather a gamble.”130 
Again, McCullough, the barbershop murder case, best demonstrates 
the point.131 There, the only evidence corroborating the stranger’s identi-
fication was the accomplice-cooperator’s testimony that he dropped 
McCullough off at the barbershop and drove him away after the shooting. 
Before trial, McCullough proffered expert testimony regarding numerous 
identification factors, such as weapon focus.132 The trial court blocked the 
expert because the accomplice-cooperator’s testimony was “sufficient 
corroboration.”133 Mr. McCullough was convicted. 
Three Appellate Division justices then found the corroboration in-
sufficient because the accomplice was a “liar” who only identified Mr. 
McCullough after he was promised a beneficial plea bargain.134 Further, 
the accomplice “had never met defendant prior to the robbery,” “remained 
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in the vehicle during the robbery,” and had a limited opportunity to ob-
serve the shooter.135 
The Appellate Division dissenters had a different view, finding the 
accomplice’s testimony “reliable” because it was “very detailed.”136 The 
dissent concluded that the accomplice’s testimony “harmonized with the 
eyewitness’s testimony in such a manner as to furnish the necessary” cor-
roboration.137 
In the Court of Appeals, a four-judge majority found that the trial 
court correctly blocked the expert on corroboration grounds.138 The ma-
jority found that given the corroboration, “the trial court was entitled to 
reject the expert testimony after balancing the probative value of the evi-
dence against its prejudicial or otherwise harmful effects.”139 
In dissent, Judge Rivera (joined by two other judges) concluded that 
the accomplice’s testimony “lack[ed] ‘the strong indicia’ necessary to 
sufficiently corroborate” the identification.140 The dissent did not trust the 
accomplice because he initially implicated others in the offense without 
mentioning McCullough.141 While the accomplice claimed he did not in-
itially reference McCullough because “he did not know everything about 
what happened,” the dissent found that excuse “unbelievable given [the 
accomplice’s] role as the getaway driver.”142 But even if this “was a ten-
able excuse, it would not outweigh the other circumstances pointing to his 
unreliability.”143 
McCullough proves just how arbitrary the corroboration rule is. The 
flawed rule requires judges to participate in what ultimately amounts to a 
subjective summation battle regarding the apparent strength of the gov-
ernment’s case. 
The dissent in McCullough, however, is perhaps just as flawed as the 
majority’s opinion because it reinforces the mistaken belief that judges 
have the right to pin the admissibility of defense evidence to their opinion 
about the strength of the government’s case. Indeed, even if judges could 
gauge corroboration with some level of consistency, that would not mat-
ter. The core vice of the corroboration rule is not unworkability, but rather 
its violation of the basic rule that “the law of evidence does not grant trial 
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courts the liberty to decide what evidence is admissible based, either in 
whole or in part, on the strength of the [adversary’s] case.”144 The solu-
tion, therefore, is to stop considering corroboration altogether, not to try 
to improve the standard or narrow its reach.145 The Court of Appeals 
should take that step and hold that the strength of the government’s case 
is irrelevant to the admissibility of a defense expert. 
III. THE CORROBORATION RULE IS ALSO UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Precluding a relevant identification expert because a judge finds the 
government’s evidence strong is also unconstitutional, violating the con-
stitutional rights to present a complete defense and compulsory pro-
cess.146 
The “Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful op-
portunity to present a complete defense.’”147 “This right is abridged by 
evidence rules that infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to 
serve.”148 The Supreme Court has not specifically clarified which 
Amendment establishes the complete-defense right, instead explaining 
that it is either rooted in the Due Process, Compulsory Process, or Con-
frontation Clauses.149 
In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court applied its com-
plete-defense jurisprudence to a South Carolina rule that barred evidence 
of third-party guilt if a judge found the government’s evidence 
“strong.”150 There, the South Carolina courts blocked evidence that an-
other person had committed the offense because the government’s case, 
which consisted of DNA evidence, was otherwise compelling.151 Under 
the South Carolina rule, the trial judge “does not focus on the probative 
value or the potential adverse effects of admitting the defense evidence of 
third-party guilt.”152 Instead, like the New York corroboration rule,  
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The critical inquiry concerns the strength of the prosecution’s 
case: If the prosecution’s case is strong enough, the evidence of 
third-party guilt is excluded even if that evidence, viewed inde-
pendently, would have great probative force and even if it would 
not pose an undue risk of harassment, prejudice, or confusion of 
the issues.”153  
The South Carolina rule embraced the following logic: “[S]trong evi-
dence” of guilt renders the defense’s third-party evidence “weak.”154 
A unanimous Supreme Court held that this state evidentiary rule vi-
olated the right to present a complete defense because it was arbitrary and 
illogical.155 The rule was illogical because “an accurate evaluation of the 
prosecution’s proof, and the true strength of the prosecution’s proof can-
not be assessed without considering challenges to the reliability of the 
prosecution’s evidence.”156 Thus, while it may be true that “the prosecu-
tion’s evidence, if credited, would provide strong support for a guilty ver-
dict,” that does not justify precluding exculpatory evidence because only 
the jury can determine whether evidence should be “credited.”157 Indeed, 
“where the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of 
its evidence is not conceded, the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot 
be assessed without making the sort of factual findings that have tradi-
tionally been reserved for the [jury].”158 
The Court further held that the South Carolina rule was just as illog-
ical as its converse, that is, “a rule barring the prosecution from introduc-
ing evidence of a defendant’s guilt if the defendant” presented evidence 
that “if believed, strongly supports a verdict of not guilty.”159 By “evalu-
ating the strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can 
be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the 
other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule [here] did not heed this 
point, the rule is ‘arbitrary.’”160 
At its core, Holmes found it unconstitutional to preclude exculpatory 
evidence under the theory that because the government’s case is strong, 
the defense evidence is immaterial. Such an approach inverts the basic 
structure of our jury system: Jurors assess the reliability of the govern-
ment’s evidence and weigh it against the defense’s evidence after hearing 
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the relevant evidence. A court cannot put its thumb on the scales by (1) 
weighing the evidence; (2) reaching a “conclusion on its own about fac-
tually who committed the crime”; and then (3) shaping “the evidence the 
jury hear[s] to conform the verdict to the trial court’s factual conclu-
sion.”161 
As several courts and judges have suggested162—but the Court of 
Appeals has not yet addressed—Holmes invalidates a rule barring a de-
fense expert because the government has evidence which, “if credited, 
would provide strong support for a guilty verdict.”163 As Holmes ex-
plained, by “evaluating the strength of only [the government’s] evidence, 
no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary 
evidence”—here an exculpatory defense witness—offered “to rebut or 
cast doubt.”164 And like the rule in Holmes, the corroboration rule ignores 
that “the strength of the prosecution’s case cannot be assessed without 
making the sort of factual findings that have traditionally been reserved 
for the [jury].”165 Accordingly, the corroboration rule is arbitrary and vi-
olates the right to present a complete defense.166 
A leading treatise notes that Holmes may “arguably” be distinguish-
able from the identification-expert context because third-party-guilt evi-
dence (at issue in Holmes) proves “innocence” while expert-identification 
testimony “merely casts general doubts on one aspect of the state’s 
case.”167 This suggestion rests on a distinction between evidence that un-
dermines the reliability of the government’s evidence and evidence that 
completely disposes of the government’s case (such as third-party-guilt 
evidence). 
This distinction fails under the logic of Holmes. Holmes precludes 
courts from excluding defense testimony on the grounds that since the 
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government’s case seems strong, any contrary defense evidence must be 
weak.168 Holmes thus prohibits a particular justification for barring de-
fense evidence; it is not concerned with how important the evidence is to 
the defense. The significance of the proffered testimony is relevant to 
harmless error on appeal, not trial-level admissibility under the Constitu-
tion. 
The Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause also dooms 
New York’s corroboration approach.169 The Clause guarantees that in all 
criminal cases, “the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Although the Clause’s text 
only formally addresses the right to compel a favorable witness’s attend-
ance, the Supreme Court has held that the Clause covers the broader right 
to call favorable witnesses.170 As the Court held in Washington v. Texas, 
the framers “did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defend-
ant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had 
no right to use.”171 
Under the Compulsory Process Clause, a defendant has the right to 
call an identification expert regardless of corroboration because that wit-
ness will testify in “his favor.”172 Only by rewriting the Clause could we 
bar favorable defense witnesses on the grounds that a judge finds the gov-
ernment’s evidence reliable. The Clause guarantees the right to call wit-
nesses in the defendant’s favor. It does not empower a judge to eliminate 
that right because the judge looks “favorably” upon the government’s ev-
idence. 
Crawford v. Washington,173 a Sixth Amendment Confrontation 
Clause case, confirms the Sixth Amendment violation here.174 Crawford 
held that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously 
reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because a defendant is ob-
viously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”175 
Under Crawford’s Sixth Amendment logic, the corroboration rule 
violates the Compulsory Process Clause. Just as courts cannot block con-
frontation of a government witness because that witness is “reliable,” they 
also cannot block defendants from attacking a witness through compul-
sory process on that same nebulous ground.   
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,176 another Sixth Amendment Con-
frontation Clause case, drives home the point. There, Massachusetts ar-
gued that a defendant lacks the right to confront testimony that a sub-
stance is cocaine because the Confrontation Clause only covers testimony 
that, “taken alone,” proves guilt.177 Under that approach, the accused 
could not confront a forensic analyst’s testimony that a substance is co-
caine. That testimony, “taken alone,” does not prove guilt without addi-
tional evidence connecting the accused to that substance.178 
Melendez-Diaz soundly rejected this formalism.179 As the Court 
held, the Sixth Amendment’s twin rights to confront “witnesses” and call 
“favor[able]” witnesses “contemplate[ ] two classes of witnesses—those 
against the defendant and those in his favor. The prosecution must pro-
duce the former; the defendant may call the latter . . . . [T]here is not a 
third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow im-
mune from confrontation.”180 Accordingly, the importance of the testi-
mony under attack—i.e., whether it is just “part of” the government’s case 
or whether it “alone” “suffice[s] to convict”—is irrelevant.181 
Similar analysis nullifies the corroboration rule. There is no category 
of defense witnesses who are favorable to the defense but “immune from” 
compulsory process because they challenge prosecution testimony that 
does not constitute the government’s entire case.182 On the contrary, a de-
fendant has the right to employ the Sixth Amendment’s protections 
against inculpatory testimony regardless of that testimony’s apparent cen-
trality to the government’s case.183 
If the government wants to prevent the accused from challenging a 
witness with a relevant counter-witness, it can decline to call the inculpa-
tory witness to the stand. But the Constitution bars the government from 
presenting that inculpatory witness to the jury and then tying the defend-
ant’s hands. 
IV. THE BETTER APPROACH: A RETURN TO COMMON-LAW STANDARDS 
OF EVIDENCE 
The common-law and constitutional analysis articulated above does 
not preclude a court from barring or limiting expert-identification testi-
mony when its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by a serious 
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risk of undue prejudice, such as jury confusion.184 That rule governs all 
relevant and material testimony. So, if the defense insists that expert tes-
timony regarding weapon focus will require a deep dive into complex sta-
tistics, a court could find that the testimony’s potential for confusion sub-
stantially outweighs its probative value. What courts cannot do, however, 
is credit the government’s non-identification evidence, find sufficient cor-
roboration, identify nothing prejudicial or confusing about the expert tes-
timony, and then bar the expert on corroboration grounds alone. That is 
precisely what the Court of Appeals has permitted for the last 20 years. 
And that is what should end. 
In assessing whether expert testimony should be barred because its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice, 
courts must exercise serious care. First, wholesale “rejection of expert 
testimony is the exception rather than the rule.”185 That approach is con-
sistent with two core principles: (1) jurors should have access to relevant 
evidence that enhances the truth-seeking function of the trial;186 and (2) 
experts can play an important role in a trial by clarifying the evidence.187 
Second, “[a] court’s discretion in evidentiary rulings is circum-
scribed by the rules of evidence and the defendant’s constitutional right 
to present a defense.”188 At a minimum, that principle requires trial courts 
to specifically articulate a significant impediment to the trial’s truth-seek-
ing function before barring an expert. Clichés like “this scientist will dis-
tract the jury” fail as they are general claims that fail to identify a specific 
impediment to the truth-seeking function. “[I]n order for a [trial] court to 
exclude scientific evidence, there must be something particularly confus-
ing [or otherwise prejudicial] about the scientific evidence at issue—
something other than the general complexity of scientific evidence.”189 
Third, courts must consider alternatives to wholesale preclusion, 
such as limitations on expert testimony. For example, if a defendant prof-
fers expert testimony that involves complex statistical data, courts can ad-
dress a confusion concern by limiting the expert testimony to the conclu-
sion itself. It will be the rare case where the expert’s bottom-line 
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conclusion and a brief description of the underlying scientific theory or 
experiments will be so confusing that a court could reasonably choose 
wholesale preclusion over careful limitation. 
CONCLUSION: PEOPLE V. BOONE PROVIDES SOME HOPE FOR REFORM 
The Court of Appeals should abolish the anomalous corroboration 
rule. This important change will ensure that before convicting an individ-
ual, the jury learns valuable testimony. That’s what’s supposed to happen 
in a jury system. 
People v. Boone,190 which addressed the right to an instruction on 
cross-racial identifications, may provide some hope for reform. There, the 
Court of Appeals held that a trial court must instruct the jury regarding 
the unreliability of cross-racial identifications whenever the “identifica-
tion of the defendant is at issue” and “the identifying witness and defend-
ant appear to be of different races.”191 Although the Court mentioned New 
Jersey precedent that had previously pinned the instruction to the absence 
of corroboration,192 Boone rejected that approach, instead holding that the 
charge applies whenever the cross-racial nature of the identification is rel-
evant.193 The trial court, Boone held, “should not engage in a weight anal-
ysis as to the quantitative degree of risk of misidentification at this thresh-
old stage.”194 
Boone correctly holds that regardless of corroboration of the eyewit-
ness identification, jurors must be educated about its reliability. Rele-
vancy is the touchstone. The same logic covers the right to present iden-
tification experts. The government cannot ask the jury to consider 
identification evidence while simultaneously shielding it from attack. 
Any decent commitment to fair play bars that one-sided approach. 
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